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1. Alison Yurko, A Practical Perspective About Annexation in Florida, 25 STETSON L.
REV. 699, 706 (1996).
2. Id.  (“[A]nnexation is extremely important to a growing city as it presents economic
opportunity, social equity and expanded urban services.”).
3. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 83 (2d ed. 1998).
4. Scott D. Makar & Michael L. Buckner, Son of Snyder: Municipal Annexations and
Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 133, 133-34 (1999) (“An obvious purpose
of the annexation is to increase the city’s tax base.”).
5. Yurko, supra note 1, at 699.
6. Makar & Buckner, supra note 4, at 136-37.
7. Id.
8. 2004 OK 60, 102 P.3d 120 (reh’g denied Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Seminole].
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NOTE
Losing Ground: Seminole and the Annexation Power of
Municipalities in Oklahoma
I. Introduction
The power to annex property is an important tool of city and state
legislatures.   The need for municipalities to extend their boundaries because1
of a growing population, or to extend services to an area outside the city’s
existing limits, often leads municipalities to annex outlying areas.2
Annexation is the incorporation of additional territory into an existing political
unit such as a country, state, city, or county.   The most common situations3
that lead to annexation are when (1) a city seeks to annex land to support its
growing population and to increase its tax base,  or (2) a group of4
unincorporated, private landowners petitions the municipality for annexation
with the hope that the municipality will then provide essential services such
as fire and police protection and public works to those private landowners.5
In the first situation, conflicts sometimes arise between private landowners
seeking to protect their property interests and avoid additional tax liability, and
municipalities seeking to both extend their boundaries and authority and, most
importantly, to increase their tax base.   In addition, municipalities must6
balance their own needs with the interests of property owners.7
This note focuses on the impact of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision
in In re De-Annexation of Certain Real Property from the City of Seminole  on8
two important issues — the appropriate level of judicial review to apply in
annexation decisions and the standard of reasonableness used by Oklahoma
courts.  Oklahoma case law before Seminole approved of the strip annexation
method in which a municipality uses a narrow strip or corridor of land to
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9. See, e.g., Botsford v. City of Norman, 354 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1965); Town of
Luther v. State ex rel. Harrod, 1967 OK 59, ¶ 28, 425 P.2d 986, 991; Sharp v. Oklahoma City,
1937 OK 685, ¶ 24, 74 P.2d 383, 385-86.
10. See, e.g., Botsford, 354 F.2d at 495; Town of Luther, ¶¶ 26-27, 425 P.2d at 991; Sharp,
¶¶ 21-31, 74 P.2d at 385-86.
11. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 533 (1879); City of Bethany v. Dist. Court
of Okla. County, 1948 OK 38, ¶ 12, 191 P.2d 187, 189; 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 51 (2000) [hereinafter Political
Subdivisions].
12. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 21-101 (2001) (“The municipal governing body by ordinance may
add to the municipality territory adjacent or contiguous to its corporate limits and increase or
diminish the corporate limits as the governing body deems desirable for the benefit of the
municipality.”).
13. Id.; see also id. § 21-103(A) (stating “[b]efore the governing body of a city may annex
any territory adjacent or contiguous to the city . . . ”) (emphasis added).
14. Political Subdivisions, supra note 11, § 52.
connect its boundary to an outlying piece of land.   Prior case law also gave9
municipalities significant autonomy in determining how and in what direction
those municipalities would extend their boundaries.   The Seminole decision10
may signify the beginning of a curtailment of that deference given to
municipal authority and an expansion of judicial review into annexation
decisions.
This note argues that the Oklahoma Supreme Court correctly applied the
Oklahoma annexation statutes in finding that the use of a narrow strip of land
to accomplish an annexation of outlying property is not a reasonable use of the
annexation authority of municipalities.  The court, however, failed to set forth
the appropriate standard for strip annexations, and therefore, left the question
open for future annexation proceedings.  Part II of this note discusses
Oklahoma precedent in the area of annexation.  Part III discusses the
background of the Seminole case, including the pertinent facts and procedure
of the case.  Part IV examines the holding in Seminole, and Part V analyzes the
decision in light of related precedent and statutory interpretation.
II. Case Law Before Seminole
A. “Adjacency and Contiguity” and the Strip Annexation Method
State legislatures have full power to authorize the extension of boundaries
without the consent of the residents of the annexed territory.   In Oklahoma,11
the state legislature delegated the authority to annex property to
municipalities.   Under Oklahoma law, the territory to be annexed must be12
“adjacent and contiguous” to the existing municipality.   Generally, lands are13
contiguous if they are “not separated from a [municipality] by outside lands.”14
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/5
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15. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 21-103(A).
16. Id. § 21-103(A)(1).
17. Id. § 21-103(A)(2).
18. 1949 OK 266, 212 P.2d 482.
19. Id. ¶ 4, 212 P.2d at 483.
20. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 481 (1941), stating in pertinent part:
[I]n no case shall any additional territory . . . be added to the city limits without
the consent in writing of the owners of a majority of the whole number of acres
owned by residents . . . , except that when three sides of such additional territory
is adjacent to, or abutting on, property already within the city limits, such territory
may be added to the city limits without the consent hereinbefore mentioned . . . .
Id.
21. City of Ada, ¶ 5, 212 P.2d at 483.
22. Id. ¶ 13, 212 P.2d at 483.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
The Oklahoma annexation statute states that “[b]efore a city may annex any
territory adjacent or contiguous to the city, it must obtain the written consent
of the owners of at least a majority of the acres to be annexed to the
municipality.”   There are two exceptions to this consent requirement: (1)15
where “[t]he territory to be annexed is subdivided into tracts or parcels of less
than five . . . acres and contains more than one residence;”  or (2) where16
“[t]hree sides of the territory to be annexed are adjacent or contiguous to the
property already within the [city] limits.”   The Oklahoma courts have not17
explicitly stated what constitutes contiguity for purposes of satisfying the
statute, but they have applied the term in several cases.
In City of Ada v. Whitaker,  the plaintiff landowners claimed that they did18
not consent to the annexation of their property.   Under the statute in place at19
the time a municipality could only annex land without the consent of the
owners of a majority of the acreage if three sides of the land were adjacent to
or abutting property already within the city limits.   Here, the question before20
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff landowners’ property
was indeed “abutting” or “adjacent” to the City of Ada, a question requiring
a discussion of the definition and usage of these terms.   The plaintiffs’ land21
consisted of a ten-acre square parcel measuring 660 feet by 660 feet.   The22
north and east sides of the plaintiffs’ land were found to be completely
adjacent to City of Ada property.   The west side of the plaintiffs’ land,23
however, was only adjacent to City of Ada property for 390 of the 660 acres.24
The dispute before the court was whether the partial adjacency was sufficient
to constitute adjacency under the statute.25
Equating the term “adjacent” to that of “contiguous,” the court cited with
approval a Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion on a similar matter, which
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26. Id. ¶ 21, 212 P.2d at 484 (citing In re Sadler, 21 A. 978 (Pa. 1891)).
27. Id. ¶ 22, 212 P.2d at 485.
28. Id.  The Oklahoma statute in place at the time of this decision provided, in pertinent
part, “where the territory sought to be added is separated from the city limits by an intervening
strip less than four rods in width upon the land so detached by such strip shall be considered as
adjacent or abutting within the meaning of this section.”  Id. ¶ 18, 212 P.2d at 484 (quoting 11
OKLA. STAT. § 481 (1941)).  A similar provision is currently codified at title 11, section 21-102
of the Oklahoma Statutes, which states “[w]here any territory to be annexed is separated from
the corporate limits of the municipality only by a railway right-of-way, an intervening strip less
than four (4) rods wide, or a highway right-of-way, the territory shall be considered adjacent
or contiguous to the municipality.”
29. City of Ada, ¶ 22, 212 P.2d at 485.
30. The strip annexation method may also be referred to as “shoestring,” “lasso,” or “flag
pole.”  Seminole, supra note 8, ¶ 17 n.34, 102 P.3d at 128 n.34.
31. Id. 
32. Political Subdivisions, supra note 11, § 53; 11 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Contiguity
of Land Annexed by Municipality § 5 (1976) (“Part of the adverse reaction of some courts to
annexation of irregularly shaped parcels lies in the fact that the inclusion of long, narrow strips
of land results in territorial shapes which deviate considerably from the model rectangles or
squares.” (citing Clark v. Holt, 237 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1951); In re Buffalo Grove, 261 N.E.2d
746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970))).
33. Political Subdivisions, supra note 11, § 53.
stated,  “‘[t]he word “adjacent” we think is used in its primary and obvious
sense as “adjoining” or “contiguous” . . . .’”   The Oklahoma Supreme Court26
went on to reason that the term “adjacent” did not apply where there was
intervening property between the current municipality and the proposed
annexed property because such intervening property would render the primary
purposes and obligations of establishing a municipality, such as the location
and grading of streets and the laying of sewers, impracticable.   The27
Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
stating, “[i]t is . . . obvious that the legislature did not intend to provide for the
annexation of territory to a city with intervening territory, except where such
intervening territory is a strip less than four rods in width.”   In this case, the28
court held that the statutory requirements of adjacency were not satisfied.29
A seeming contradiction to the concept of adjacency and contiguity is strip
or “shoestring” annexation.  Under the strip annexation method,  “a city uses30
a narrow [strip or] corridor to connect its . . . boundary to an outlying
noncontiguous area.”   Generally, courts disfavor finding one territory to be31
contiguous to another for annexation purposes where the only link between the
two territories is a narrow corridor.   Annexations performed in this fashion32
are the equivalent of isolated areas of land connected solely by a “technical
strip a few feet wide” and, therefore, are not considered consistent with
legislative intent.   The use of such strip annexations is a frequent cause of33
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34. Ronald E. Gother, A Study of Recent Amendments to California Annexation Laws, 11
UCLA L. REV. 41, 52 (1963-64) (“Probably no other procedure has caused more difficulty and
concern, nor produced a greater measure of hardship . . . and confused and overlapping
territorial boundaries than strip annexations.”).
35. 1937 OK 685, 74 P.2d 383.
36. Id. ¶ 20, 74 P.2d at 385.  The court in Sharp distinguished contrary cases in other
jurisdictions, such as California, on the basis that the foreign statute differed by requiring “the
tracts to be contiguous and ‘inhabited’ or an affirmative majority vote of each separate
noncontiguous tract,” while the Oklahoma statute at issue only required the written consent of
the resident owners of a majority of acres to be annexed.  Id. ¶ 17, 74 P.2d at 385; see also
Town of Luther v. State ex rel. Harrod, 1967 OK 59, 425 P.2d 986.
37. Sharp, ¶ 6, 74 P.2d at 384.
38. Id. ¶ 26, 74 P.2d at 386.
39. 354 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1965).
40. Id. at 492, 494.
41. Id. at 494. 
42. Id. at 493.
conflict between municipalities and the owners of the land proposed for
annexation.34
In Oklahoma, however, courts have consistently upheld annexations
resembling the strip method as reasonable under the annexation statutes.  In
Sharp v. Oklahoma City,  the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the35
annexation of territory that was connected to the city solely by a narrow strip
of land 177.5 feet wide and 1662 feet long, finding that the annexation statute
did not limit the extent, form, or shape of the land proposed to be annexed.36
In that case, the city obtained the written consent of the owners of a majority
of the whole number of acres to be added.   Because the city obtained this37
consent, the exception discussed in City of Ada, which did not require consent
where three sides of the annexed property was adjacent to property already
within city limits, did not apply in Sharp.38
Likewise, in Botsford v. City of Norman,  the U.S. Court of Appeals for the39
Tenth Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, upheld the annexation of 112,000 acres
through the prior annexation of a sixty-seven-foot-wide strip of land extending
nineteen miles away from the edge of Norman city limits.   The territory40
proposed for addition to the City of Norman could only be annexed in this case
by the consent of the owners of a majority of the acres of the property unless
three sides of the property were bounded by property within the city limits.41
Because the targeted property was only bounded on its west side by Norman
city limits, the city would have had to obtain the consent of the owners to have
a valid annexation under the statute.   Unable to secure the consent of the42
owners, the City of Norman opted to annex a strip of land that comprised the
southern and eastern boundaries of the targeted land to satisfy the statutory
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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43. Id. at 492.  The sixty-seven-foot-wide strip extended fourteen miles east and then five
miles north from the Norman city limits.  Id.
44. Id. at 494.
45. Id. at 493.
46. Id. at 494.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Taylor v. City of Chandler, 498 P.2d 158, 159 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); City
of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 203 P.2d 807, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Banzer v. City
of Wichita, 703 P.2d 812, 815 (Kan. 1985); City of Claremore v. Town of Verdigris, 2001 OK
91, ¶ 17, 50 P.3d 208, 213.
50. Sharp v. Oklahoma City, 1937 OK 685, ¶ 19, 74 P.2d 383, 385 (quoting People ex rel.
Peck v. City of Los Angeles, 97 P. 311, 313 (Cal. 1908)).
requirement that three sides be bounded by property within the city limits.43
The city obtained consent from owners of the property in the strip, and
therefore, the annexation of the strip itself was valid under the statute.   Upon44
annexation of the strip parcel, the city proceeded in annexing the targeted
property.45
Clearly, the only purpose behind the annexation of the sixty-seven-foot-
wide strip of land was to connect the desired outlying property to Norman.
Relying on Sharp, the Tenth Circuit found that although the strip was only
connected to Norman at the southeastern edge of the old city limits and
extended east away from the city for fourteen miles and then north for five
miles, that point of connection was sufficient to satisfy the adjacency
requirement under the statute.   Therefore, the court upheld the annexation of46
a strip parcel as proper for the purpose of annexing property that did not itself
satisfy the adjacency standard under the Oklahoma statute.47
B. Annexation as a “Political Decision” and the Standard of Judicial
Review
The scope and extent of a municipality’s expansion is considered a political
or solely legislative question, and thus, courts are limited in the extent to
which they can review annexation decisions.   Courts in some states,48
including Oklahoma, have stated that a municipality’s decision to annex
property is a purely legislative determination that will not be subjected to
judicial review other than to determine whether an annexation facially meets
the statutory requirements.49
In Sharp, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that “‘the extent and shape
which the annexed territory shall take is a political and not a judicial
question.’”   In finding that the court would not interfere with the50
municipality’s decision to annex a particular territory, the Sharp court
reasoned that courts cannot require cities to annex territory that is in a
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/5
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51. Id. ¶ 16, 74 P.2d at 385.
52. 1983 OK 44, 662 P.2d 1375.
53. Id. ¶ 1, 662 P.2d at 1376.
54. Id. ¶ 3, 662 P.2d at 1376 (“‘If the district court finds that the request of the petitioners
should be granted and can be granted without injustice to the inhabitants or persons interested,
the court shall issue an order declaring annexation of the territory to the municipality. If the
court finds against the petitioners, the petition shall be dismissed at the cost of the petitioners.’”
(quoting 11 OKLA. STAT. § 21-107 (1981))).
55. Id. ¶ 11, 662 P.2d at 1377.
56. Political Subdivisions, supra note 11, § 344 (“[T]he reasonableness or not of a proposed
annexation is a judicial question, and its decision is a judicial function.” (citing Extension of
Boundaries of Biloxi v. City of Biloxi, 361 So. 2d 1372 (Miss. 1978))).
57. Robert W. Parnacott, Annexation in Kansas, 70 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 28, 38 (2001).
“[L]egislature[s] may not delegate [power] to the courts . . . to determine the conditions on
which certain territory shall be [annexed or detached from municipalities]; but the courts may
be authorized to determine questions of fact, such as the question whether the law has been
complied with.”  16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 155 (1984).
58. 354 F.2d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1965).
59. Id.
particular shape or in a “compact form” because the direction in which a city
will expand or the shape such expansion will take cannot be predicted.51
In In re De-Annexation of Certain Real Property,  the Oklahoma Supreme52
Court reviewed a district court order of detachment of certain property from
the Town of Talihina, pursuant to a request by the interested property
owners.   The Town of Talihina appealed the order of detachment, arguing53
that annexation decisions are purely legislative, and therefore, the statute at
issue unconstitutionally granted the judiciary the authority to decide whether
it should grant a petition for annexation or detachment.   The Oklahoma54
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the determination of whether a petition for
annexation can be granted without injustice to the residents or interested
persons is purely legislative.55
Courts are otherwise limited to reviewing annexation decisions for
reasonableness,  or to determining whether the annexation falls within the56
statutory authority of the municipality.   In Botsford v. City of Norman, the57
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that the primary judicial role
in reviewing annexations is to determine whether the municipality took
reasonable action within the scope of its legislative authority.   The court58
further stated that in making such determinations “[d]iscretionary matters
involving economic or political considerations are outside judicial
cognizance.”59
Against this backdrop of statutory interpretation and precedent, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court considered In re De-Annexation of Certain Real
Property from the City of Seminole to determine whether the use of a narrow
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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60. Seminole, Okla., Ordinance 917 (Dec. 6, 1999).
61. Petition at 12-13, In re: De-annexation of Certain Real Prop. from the City of Seminole,
No. 98,038 (Seminole County, Okla. Dist. Ct. Seminole County, Okla. Mar. 28, 2000)
(unpublished) [hereinafter Petition for De-Annexation].
62. Id.
63. Seminole, supra note 8, ¶ 2, 102 P.3d at 123.
64. Id. ¶ 6, 102 P.3d at 124.
65. Petition for De-Annexation, supra note 61, at 12-13.
66. Seminole, ¶ 2, 102 P.3d at 123.
67. Id.
68. Id.; 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-314 (2001).
strip of land connecting the City of Seminole to noncontiguous outlying land
satisfied the statutory contiguity standard.
III. Statement of the Case: In re De-Annexation of Certain Real Property
from the City of Seminole
In December 1999, the City of Seminole enacted Ordinance Number 917,
which annexed several pieces of property in Seminole County.   The owners60
of six parcels of land opposed the annexation of their property, all of which is
located in the southeast quadrant of the intersection of I-40 and Highway 99
in Seminole County.   This land was home to several businesses, including a61
Love’s Country Store, restaurants, grocery stores, and gas stations.   This62
property was located ten miles from the city limits, while a narrow strip of
land connecting the city and the targeted property was annexed in order to
provide the contiguity required under the statute.   The relevant property63
owners opposed the annexation, however, the city was able to obtain the
consent of a majority of the owners of the acreage annexed.   Although the64
consenting landowners did in fact own a majority of the acres of the land to be
annexed, the nonconsenting landowners claimed that this land was
overwhelmingly undeveloped, whereas the property owned by the
nonconsenting landowners was commercially developed.65
The nonconsenting landowners contested Ordinance Number 917 by
petitioning the City of Seminole for deannexation of their property.   After66
Seminole denied their request, the landowners sued Seminole in the District
Court of Seminole County, seeking a declaration of the invalidity of the
ordinance and a restraining order to enjoin Seminole from proceeding with the
annexation.67
Along with their claim that the ordinance was invalid because it did not
meet the statutory standard of contiguity, the landowners argued that Seminole
enacted the ordinance at a meeting held December 6, 1999 in violation of the
Open Meeting Act.   The district court agreed with the landowners that68
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/5
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69. Seminole, ¶ 2, 102 P.3d at 123.
70. Id.; see also 25 OKLA. STAT. § 313 (“Any action taken in willful violation of [the Open
Meeting] act shall be invalid.” (footnote omitted)).
71. Seminole, Okla., Ordinance 941 (Aug. 7, 2001).
72. Seminole, ¶ 2, 102 P.3d at 123.  After the enactment of Ordinance Number 941,
petitioners and respondents amended their pleadings and motions for summary judgment to
reassert their arguments as they related to Ordinance Number 917.  Id. ¶ 3, 102 P.3d at 123.
73. Id. ¶ 4, 102 P.3d at 124. The issues related to Ordinance Number 917 and the Open
Meeting Act violation were left unresolved and the district court’s order relating to Ordinance
Number 941 was certified for immediate appeal.  Id. ¶ 4, 102 P.3d at 123-24.
74. Id. ¶ 4, 102 P.3d at 124.
75. In re De-Annexation of Certain Real Prop. from the City of Seminole, No. 98,038, ¶
10 (Okla. Civ. App. June 20, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (citing City of Bethany v. Dist. Court
of Okla. County, 1948 OK 38, ¶¶ 11-13, 191 P.2d 187, 189).
Seminole violated the Open Meeting Act because the city did not adequately
publish notice of the meeting and its subject matter.   The presiding judge69
scheduled a hearing to determine whether Seminole willfully violated the
Open Meeting Act, a finding that would render the annexation invalid.70
Before the hearing, however, Seminole enacted Ordinance Number 941,71
which purportedly vacated Ordinance Number 917.  Subsequently, Seminole
reannexed the property of the protesting landowners as well as that of the
consenting landowners under Ordinance Number 941.   Ordinance Number72
941 was essentially identical to Ordinance Number 917, which certainly made
it appear that Seminole enacted Ordinance Number 941 to replace Ordinance
Number 917 solely because it violated the Open Meeting Act.
Seminole filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the
statutory requirements of both contiguity and consent of the owners of a
majority of acreage were satisfied and, therefore, the courts should not inquire
into the annexation beyond such facial validity under the statute.  The district
court granted Seminole’s motion for summary judgment on the claims related
to Ordinance Number 941,  and the landowners appealed to the Oklahoma73
Court of Civil Appeals.74
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Seminole, stating that “[a] municipality may act in its
legislative capacity whenever and wherever its interest is properly concerned,
and its legislative judgment of the necessity of action is final and conclusive,
subject only to the reasonableness of its ordinances and the enforcement of
them.”   The court also stated that the rights of the individual must generally75
yield to the rights of the public, and the courts should not interfere with a
municipality’s lawful use of its legislative power merely because it burdens an
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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76. Id. ¶ 12.
77. Seminole, ¶ 1, 102 P.3d at 123.
78. Id. ¶16, 102 P.3d at 128.  The majority also noted that this was a case of first
impression.  Id.
79. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13, 102 P.3d at 124, 127.
80. Id. ¶ 28, 102 P.3d at 132.
81. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 102 P.3d at 132-33 (Watt, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Botsford v. City of Norman, 354 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1965); Sharp v.
Oklahoma City, 1937 OK 685, ¶ 31, 74 P.2d 383, 386.
83. Seminole, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d at 124.
individual.   The landowners then appealed the grant of summary judgment76
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.77
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
City of Seminole’s annexation of noncontiguous tracts of land by use of a strip
of land three feet wide and seven to ten miles long that connected to the city
limits at its northern boundary, reasonably satisfied the statutory standard of
contiguity.   Even though the annexation in Seminole satisfied the written78
consent formalities prescribed in title 11, section 21-103 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, the court analyzed the annexation for its reasonable application of the
adjacency or contiguity standard.79
The court held that the type of strip annexation used by Seminole was not
a reasonable exercise of the annexation authority granted to municipalities by
the legislature, stating that “[a] corridor-style annexation by which remote
territories are connected to the existing city limits by a narrow 3-foot wide
strip of territory does not satisfy the legislatively crafted contiguity
standard.”   In a dissent, Justice Watt, joined by Justice Hodges, stated that the80
majority’s opinion in this case could not be squared with prior Oklahoma
cases, all of which authorized the use of the strip annexation method and held
that such annexation decisions are political decisions with which the court
shall not interfere.81
IV. The Reasoning Behind the Seminole Decision
A. The Majority’s Opinion
1. Adjacency or Contiguity Standard and the Strip Annexation Method
Previous cases in Oklahoma have upheld the strip method as a valid
exercise of the annexation authority of a municipality.   In Seminole, the82
landowners argued that the statutory contiguity requirement for annexation of
noncontiguous commercial tracts along a ten-mile stretch of highway was not
satisfied by using a three-foot-wide strip of land to connect the tracts to the
City of Seminole.   The landowners also argued that Seminole included the83
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84. Id.
85. Id. ¶ 6, 102 P.3d at 124.  The Supreme Court did not address the issue of notice under
the Open Meeting Act in its opinion, but limited its decision to reviewing the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City of Seminole.  Id. ¶ 6 n.7, 102 P.3d at 124 n.7.
86. Id. ¶ 6, 102 P.3d at 124-25.
87. Id. ¶ 17, 102 P.3d at 128.
88. See, e.g., Claremore v. Town of Verdigris, 2001 OK 91, ¶¶ 11-12, 50 P.3d 208, 211;
Town of Luther v. State ex rel. Harrod, 1967 OK 59, ¶ 28, 425 P.2d 986, 991; Botsford v. City
of Norman, 354 F.2d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1965); 2002 OK AG 15, ¶ 7, 2 Okla. Op. Att’y Gen.
15; 1986 OK AG 16, ¶ 8, 18 Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. 13; 1981 OK AG 284, ¶ 2, 13 Okla. Op.
Att’y Gen. 482.
89. Seminole, ¶¶ 13-16, 102 P.3d at 127-28.
90. Id. ¶ 20, 102 P.3d at 130 (citing City of Ada v. Whitaker, 1949 OK 266, ¶ 21, 212 P.2d
482, 484) (emphasis omitted).  The terms are not defined in the statute itself.  The Seminole
court noted, however, that “contiguity generally requires some touching of the municipality and
the territory to be annexed.”  Id. ¶ 20, 102 P.3d at 129-30 (emphasis omitted).
91. 11 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Contiguity of Land Annexed by Municipality § 1
(2000) (citing Potvin v. Chubbuck, 284 P.2d 414 (Idaho 1955); Pyle v. Shreveport, 40 So. 2d
235 (La. 1949)).
strip of land solely for the purpose of “technically” meeting the contiguity
requirement, and therefore, Seminole’s actions were an unreasonable method
of annexation under the statute.   Seminole argued, in contrast, that the84
annexation ordinance was passed according to the statutory requirements
because it had obtained the written consent of the owners of a majority of the
acres  and the annexed territory was contiguous.85 86
The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished Sharp v. Oklahoma City and
its seemingly broad pronouncement that the shape of annexed property is a
political decision with which the court would not interfere absent express
statutory limitations.   Although courts and other authorities have frequently87
cited Sharp for the proposition that they should not consider the size and shape
of annexed property,  the Seminole court declined to follow Sharp in that88
regard and instead analyzed how the size and shape of the strip annexation
affected the reasonableness of Seminole’s use of its annexation authority.89
In analyzing whether the annexation complied with the statutory
requirement of contiguity, the court cited City of Ada v. Whitaker in support
of its determination that the terms “contiguity” and “adjacency” are to be
“treated as synonymous and . . . used in their primary and obvious sense.”90
The requirement that the land proposed for annexation be contiguous or
adjacent to the annexing municipality is intended to maintain the unified
nature of a city or town and avoid the creation of municipalities consisting of
segregated sections of land.   Furthermore, the court reasoned that the policy91
behind requiring contiguity for the annexation of territory is related to the
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“concept of a city as it relates to its territorial expansion.”   Because the92
concept of a city is that of a community gathered in a single mass with well-
defined external boundaries and not divided and severed areas, the court
determined that cities must annex property in a way that enhances the idea of
a city and not in a way that creates pockets of territories operated by the same
entity but with no physical connection between them.93
The court further stated that in a strip annexation, such as the instant case,
where a municipality uses “a narrow corridor . . . to gain access to
discontiguous tracts of land,” cities like Seminole can only meet the standard
of contiguity where the corridor or strip itself has “a tangible municipal value
or purpose at the time of annexation.”   The court specifically stated that94
“[t]he contiguity requirement is not satisfied by means of a territorial
appendage that connects several remote tracts of land to the annexing
municipality, but has little relationship to a beneficial municipal purpose.”95
This method of annexation, the court found, does not “coincide with legislative
intent.”   The Seminole court found that the individual tracts alone clearly96
failed to satisfy the statutory definition of contiguity because they were located
several miles from the city limits, and in some cases, the individual tracts were
located several miles from each other.97
The Seminole court determined that where the contiguity requirement is not
satisfied by the actual, physical contiguous border between the annexing
municipality and the territory to be annexed, the courts will determine whether
a beneficial municipal purpose justifies the annexation.   The burden of98
production, which normally rests on the shoulders of the party contesting the
annexation, shifts to the municipality to prove that the narrow strip will
“confer a beneficial use beyond its advantage to provide merely a connective
territorial link to otherwise remote noncontiguous tracts.”99
In its opinion, the Seminole court summarized the testimony of three city
council members and the assistant city manager who all indicated that
Seminole always intended to use the strip solely as a way to connect the other
tracts to the municipality.   City officials stated that they knew of no other100
use for the strip and that Seminole could “probably not” even lay a water line
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underneath the strip.   The court saw this testimony as a clear indication that101
the strip did not and was never intended to confer any beneficial use separate
from its use as a connective strip.   Indeed, Seminole’s argument was based102
solely on the claim that the corridor annexation was a reasonable method to
accomplish its goal of expanding municipal boundaries.   The Oklahoma103
Supreme Court rejected this argument and found that the use of the corridor
annexation was not reasonable.104
2. Annexation as a “Political Decision” and the Standard of Judicial
Review
In its opinion, the court in Seminole addressed the true meaning of the term
“political decision” and its effect on the court’s analysis of annexation
decisions.   The City of Seminole relied on prior case law in this area to105
argue that the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have
“consistently held that the extent and shape of territory annexed to a city is a
political and not a judicial question.”106
The court rejected this argument, stating that the political extension of
municipal boundaries by ordinance is a legislative act of the city’s governing
body, but that such a decision is subject to judicial review.   The court further107
noted that the primary judicial function in reviewing municipal annexations is
to determine “whether the city has exercised its annexation power in a
reasonable manner and in compliance with the standards of state law.”   The108
court, having thus dismissed the argument that prior case law required
deference to a municipality’s annexation decision, reviewed Seminole’s
annexation for reasonable compliance with the Oklahoma annexation statutes.
B. The Dissent’s Opinion
Justices Watt and Hodges dissented in the Seminole opinion on the same
grounds as the City of Seminole’s argument, namely that this decision was
squarely at odds with decades of precedent.   Justice Watt argued that the109
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prior cases of Sharp,  City of Claremore v. Town of Verdigris,  Botsford v.110 111
City of Norman,  and Town of Luther v. State  “make clear that the use by112 113
a municipality of the ‘strip’ method to annex additional territory is a political
decision with which this Court will not interfere, regardless of the shape of the
annexed property.”114
V. Analysis
In prior cases dealing with issues similar to those in Seminole, the
Oklahoma courts have repeatedly held that a court will not review the size and
shape of the proposed annexation territory.   The court in Seminole115
acknowledged this by stating that prior courts, most notably the court in Sharp,
have pronounced the “shape and size of the annexed territory as a
nonjusticiable political decision.”  Nevertheless, the court proceeded to rule116
differently.  In doing so, the Oklahoma Supreme Court came to the correct
conclusion in the Seminole case, despite decades of precedent to the contrary.
The court was also correct in construing the adjacency and contiguity
requirement as prohibiting this back-door method of annexing outlying
property.  The court, however, did not go far enough in illuminating the
standard for reasonableness, and accordingly, left municipalities without a
clear guideline for future annexations.  Additionally, the court erred in not
expressly overruling prior case law that is in direct conflict with the Seminole
decision.
A. The Proper Level of Judicial Review of Annexations
The Seminole decision extended the reach of the court into a municipality’s
decision to annex a particular piece of property.  As discussed above,
precedent in this area has held that courts should not interfere with a “political
decision,” such as the shape of the annexed property.   The Seminole court,117
however, rejected this view of annexation decisions and asserted that the prior
courts erred in applying the term “political decision” to annexation
decisions.   The court in Seminole defined “political decision” as government118
action that is conclusively resolved through nonjudicial means and reasoned
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that because annexation decisions have been subject to judicial review, such
decisions cannot be political decisions.119
Rather than overrule Sharp and its statement that the shape of annexed
property is a political decision with which the court should not interfere, the
Seminole court attempted to narrowly distinguish Sharp on the basis that it did
not address whether the annexation at issue reasonably complied with the
statutory requirement of adjacency.   This failure to overrule Sharp confuses120
the situation for future annexations because the Seminole decision failed to
clarify whether the holding in Sharp — the size and shape of the annexed
property was a nonjusticiable political decision — remains the law or whether
a court may take the size and shape of the property into consideration when
reviewing the reasonableness of an annexation.
Although a primary interest of municipalities in most annexations is to
increase their tax base by acquiring areas to contribute to ad valorem taxes,
utility taxes and fees, and sales taxes,  those municipalities generally offer121
benefits to the owners of the annexed property in the form of the availability
of public works projects and other city services.   The facts in Seminole122
presented a compelling opportunity for the court to narrow the broad deference
previously given to municipalities in annexation decisions.  In this case, the
City of Seminole blatantly used the three foot wide strip of land solely as a
means to accomplish the seizure of the outlying commercial property and
accompanying sales tax revenue.   While the additional tax revenue brought123
in from the new property would flow to the City of Seminole’s coffers, city
officials admitted they did not intend to use the strip of annexed territory for
any public purpose except connecting the desired outlying property to the city
limits.   Taking such objectives and interests of both the property owners and124
the municipality into consideration regarding the reasonable compliance of the
annexation with the applicable statutes, the Seminole court went further than
previous Oklahoma courts in reviewing the annexation decision of a
municipality.
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B. Shifting the Burden and the Requirement of a Beneficial Use
The court in Seminole used a burden-shifting approach to determine the
reasonableness of Ordinance 941 under the annexation statutes.   The court125
stated that a municipal annexation ordinance enjoys a presumption of validity,
and that under normal circumstances the party challenging the validity of the
ordinance bears the burden of proving that the ordinance does not comply with
the annexation statutes.126
The Seminole court, however, held that where a city uses a strip of land as
narrow as three feet in width to connect the city limits to the targeted property,
the burden of production shifts to the municipality to show that the strip
confers a beneficial use in the form of a “tangible municipal value or purpose”
other than to merely act as a conduit from the city to the annexed property.127
Other courts have imposed this requirement when dealing with strip
annexations, and the Seminole court appears to have modeled its inclusion of
this requirement on several Kentucky decisions in which the courts invalidated
strip annexations on the grounds that the city merely used the strip as a
connecting corridor while showing no other municipal use for the strip.   For128
example, in Ridings v. City of Owensboro,  the Kentucky Supreme Court129
held that “the proper contiguity should not be found to exist in such situations
unless the corridor or finger itself has a municipal value, i.e., unless it alone
serves some municipal purpose. Otherwise, the use of the corridor or finger
must be considered a mere subterfuge.”130
In Seminole, the court found that the testimony provided by city officials
confirmed the apparent lack of beneficial value or purpose for the three-foot
strip of land.   In that testimony, Seminole council members admitted that131
“they knew of no other use for the strip” and one official described the strip as
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an “umbilical cord to tie [the tracts along the highway corridor] together.”132
In a case where the purpose of the strip of land may be less clear, however, it
is considerably more difficult to apply this imprecise standard.
First, the Seminole court does not make clear under what circumstances the
the burden shifts to the city.  The narrow holding in Seminole specifies that
where the strip is three feet wide or less, the burden will shift.  The court did
not, however, contemplate a result when the strip is seven or ten feet wide and
still has no independent municipal use.133
Second, once the burden is found to shift to the municipality for a showing
of beneficial use, the Seminole court failed to indicate what types of beneficial
uses would satisfy the requirement.  The decision provides no reference
regarding what size strip is acceptable and no guidance for determining the
requisite showing of beneficial use that is sufficient to overcome the burden
placed on the municipality.  In addition, the court does not make clear whether
the type and extent of beneficial use required depends on the size of the
annexed strip — in other words, whether the wider the annexed strip is, the
lesser a showing of beneficial use is required.  The court merely states that
there is no beneficial use present in the Seminole case.   As a result,134
municipalities looking to annex property in the future will generally be unsure
of what “tangible municipal value” means and what evidence they need to
offer to satisfy this new standard set forth by the court.
One possible way to determine the types of beneficial use the Seminole
court had in mind and the extent to which they should be implemented is to
look at what other jurisdictions have approved and required in connection with
strip annexations.  For example, in Merritt v. City of Campbellsville,  the135
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the use of a corridor as a channel for a
water main serves a legitimate public purpose and satisfies the requirement
that a corridor annexation provide a beneficial use other than to accomplish
contiguity for outlying territory.   In the instant case, if the City of Seminole136
had been able to show that it intended on placing a water main underneath the
annexed strip, the strip annexation may well have been upheld as valid.137
Third, the Seminole court failed to state whether a city must show a tangible
benefit to the property owners, such as providing fire and police protection or
extending utilities to the annexed property.  The court in Seminole provides no
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guidance on these issues.  Annexation procedures and requirements should
protect interests of the owners of the targeted property and not just the interests
of the municipality.  Seminole took an important step in this direction by
requiring more from the municipality in terms of showing some type of
beneficial use.   There should, however, also be a requirement that the city138
include a plan to extend services to the residents and businesses of the property
proposed for annexation.  In cases where, unlike the Seminole case, the
municipality did not obtain written consent and is proceeding with the
annexation by use of the statutory exceptions to consent,  the statute requires139
the municipality to publish a plan to provide services.   This, however, does140
not have an effect on a case, such as Seminole, where majority consent was
obtained.  The injustice here lies in the fact that in cases such as Seminole, the
parties who most need and want services provided by the annexing
municipality — the nonconsenting landowners who own developed property
— are left without the protection of such a requirement because the majority
owners — whose land is almost entirely undeveloped and therefore have no
use for services — consented to the annexation.
C. The Seminole Court Should Have Overruled Sharp v. Oklahoma City
and Its Progeny
As pointed out by Chief Justice Watt in his dissent, the majority opinion in
Seminole cannot be squared with the court’s precedent.   Despite the141
majority’s attempt to distinguish Sharp and its progeny, the decision in
Seminole clearly contradicts prior case law.   Prior to Seminole, Sharp and142
the decisions following it were frequently cited for the propositions that (1) the
Oklahoma Supreme Court had approved the strip method of annexation, and
(2) the annexed territory is not required to be in compact form or in any
particular shape.   To alleviate this contradiction, the Seminole court should143
have explicitly overruled Sharp.  By overruling Sharp, the court would have
clarified to municipalities that they must consider whether the size and shape
of a proposed annexation is reasonable under the adjacency and contiguity
standard.
Instead, the state of the law after Seminole is confusing and lacking in
guidance on the width and length of the strip required for a court to uphold a
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strip annexation as valid.  The only standard that can be culled from Seminole
is the statement that “[f]or statutory contiguity to be met where a narrow
corridor is used to gain access to discontiguous tracts of land, the corridor
itself must have a tangible municipal value or purpose at the time of
annexation.”   Seminole left unclear whether any size and shape strip will144
satisfy the contiguity requirement as long the city can show some beneficial
use.
To alleviate such confusion in a similar matter, the Alabama Supreme Court
took the approach of overruling its prior approval of strip annexations in City
of Fultondale v. City of Birmingham.   In that case, the Alabama Supreme145
Court reexamined its decision in City of Tuskegee v. Lacey  in which it146
upheld the use of fourteen miles of public road rights-of-way used solely to
create contiguity with outlying land and avoid the requirement of adjacency
between the annexed land and the annexing municipality.   The City of147
Fultondale court expressly overruled City of Tuskegee and held that “the use
of public road rights-of-way to create contiguity is unreasonable and invalid
as a matter of law.”   Similarly, if the Oklahoma Supreme Court had148
overruled Sharp, municipalities would have proper notice that future strip
annexations will be subjected to sharper review.
Another approach to ensure clarity and avoid confusion by municipalities
in pursuing annexations and courts in reviewing them would be for the
legislature to adopt a bright-line rule for annexations that would set out the
parameters for a valid annexation.  In Colorado, for example, the statute
regarding eligibility for annexation states that contiguity may not be
accomplished where the city uses the boundary of a previously annexed area
that is more than three miles from the annexing municipality’s boundaries to
connect to the desired land.   Additionally, contiguity may not be established149
by the use of the boundary of a territory that is then directly annexed to such
an area or indirectly annexed through multiple subsequent annexations.   This150
statute has the effect of prohibiting strip annexations such as the one used in
Seminole, where the strip itself was ten miles long and was used by the city to
connect its boundary to the boundary of the targeted area.
Similarly, the Arizona annexation statutes limit the annexation of
contiguous land to territory that is at least 200 feet wide and adjoins the
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boundary of the annexing municipality for at least 300 feet.   Essentially, this151
provision prohibits the type of narrow strip annexation at issue in Seminole by
requiring that such annexed land be at least 200 feet wide and that the annexed
land be connected to the annexing city by land that shares a common border
for 300 feet.   In June 2004, the Oklahoma Senate amended title 11, section152
21-103 of the Oklahoma Statutes, effective November 1, 2004.   The relevant153
amendment applies to a municipality that does not obtain written consent for
the annexation and uses the exception whereby three sides of the territory to
be annexed are adjacent or contiguous to the municipal limits.   The amended154
statute requires that in such an annexation, the municipality must show one of
three things to accomplish a valid annexation: (1) “the adjacent property on
each side [is] greater than 300 . . . feet at its narrowest point;” (2) “the
municipal governing body makes findings that the annexation furthers
municipal purposes relating to airports, spaceports, and military installations;”
or (3) the municipality has directed that notice be published in accordance with
[the annexation statutes].”   These new requirements, which passed both the155
Oklahoma Senate and House prior to the publication of the Seminole decision
and went into effect on November 1, 2004,  do not affect the outcome in a156
case such as Seminole.  In Seminole, these additional steps would not be
required of the municipality because the written consent of the owners of a
majority of the annexed acreage was obtained.   In a case such as Seminole,157
it appears that the only protection for the nonconsenting landowners, who in
fact own the developed land in the annexed territory, is the Seminole court’s
requirement that where the annexation is accomplished by a strip of land, a
tangible municipal purpose must be shown.  This, however, is not adequate
protection because the interests of the property owners do not necessarily
coincide with a “tangible municipal benefit.”158
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D. Future of Annexations in Oklahoma
The Seminole decision makes two significant changes to the law of
municipal annexations.  First, this decision rejects the generally deferential
approach of Oklahoma courts in the past and makes a strong statement of the
judicial authority to review the actions of municipalities in the exercise of their
annexation authority.   The implications this decision has for future159
annexations include the possibility that property owners who oppose the
annexation of their land but do not constitute the majority of owners of
property in the targeted annexation area may be more likely to contest the
annexation on the basis of unreasonableness and noncompliance with the
adjacency requirements, rather than that of noncompliance with statutory
formalities such as written consent or notice.
Second, the Seminole decision calls into question the continuing validity of
strip annexations as a method of extending the boundaries of a municipality.160
Although the decision does not directly state that strip annexations are per se
invalid in Oklahoma, their use may be significantly curtailed by future
decisions applying the standard set forth in Seminole.  Further, by requiring the
annexing municipality to prove beneficial use for the annexed strip of
property, municipalities are likely to be more reluctant to use strip
annexations.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals encountered the first post-Seminole
annexation case in Williams v. Town of Salina.   In Williams, the Town of161
Salina enacted an ordinance annexing property a mile away from the town and
on the other side of Lake Hudson.   The town also annexed the surface area162
of the Highway 20 bridge spanning Lake Hudson and connecting Salina with
the annexed property and a ten-foot wide “long, narrow strip of property along
the Lake Hudson shoreline that had previously been annexed by the town of
Pryor Creek.”   Property owners in the annexed area filed an action for163
declaratory judgment that the ordinance was void on the grounds that their
property was not contiguous or adjacent to the Town of Salina and that the
annexation of the narrow strip of land was improper.   The property owners164
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also asserted several other procedural defects in their declaratory judgment
action.   The trial court found the ordinance to be facially valid and granted165
summary judgment in favor of the Town of Salina and the property owners
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals.166
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, finding
that there was a “genuine issue of fact regarding whether the annexed property
was contiguous or adjacent to Salina.”   Addressing this issue of contiguity,167
the court acknowledged that the Seminole decision changed the landscape of
annexation cases, stating, “Oklahoma courts have historically placed few limits
on the shape or size of annexed territory . . . . However, in the recent
Oklahoma Supreme Court decision, City of Seminole, . . . the Court departed
from the reasoning in [previous] cases when it was confronted with a narrow
corridor connecting otherwise noncontiguous tracts of land.”   The court168
went on to summarize the test in Seminole as: “[f]or statutory contiguity to be
met where a narrow corridor is used to gain access to discontiguous tracts of
land, the corridor itself must have a tangible municipal value or purpose at the
time of annexation.”   The court found that the “‘narrow corridor’ rule as169
articulated in City of Seminole” applied to the Salina annexation because the
town used the mile-long bridge across the lake to connect to otherwise
noncontiguous property.   The court further stated that the town did not170
produce any evidence that the bridge provided or would provide a tangible
municipal value to the municipality beyond serving as a connection point.171
Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment
to the Town of Salina and remanded the case to “determine the validity of the
annexation ordinance in light of City of Seminole.”   This recent case172
highlights the impact that the Seminole decision has had and will continue to
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have on future annexations in Oklahoma.  Before Seminole, it is likely that the
strip annexation used by Salina would have had an almost automatic finding
of validity and that the annexation would have avoided any intense scrutiny by
the judiciary.  After Seminole, however, municipalities are discovering that
any strip annexation must be carefully supplemented with supporting evidence
of reasonableness and municipal benefit in order to pass judicial muster.
VI. Conclusion
Although ultimately coming to the correct decision in Seminole, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to provide sufficient guidance for future
annexations.  The Seminole decision essentially imposed upon Oklahoma
courts a case-by-case reasonableness determination where a clear bright-line
rule would have better served the interests of both property owners and
municipalities.  The facts in Seminole clearly do not satisfy the adjacency
requirements of the statute.  The individual tracts alone do not satisfy the
contiguity requirement and the use of the narrow strip is merely a means to an
end of reaching territory several miles away from the city limits.  The
Seminole court, however, failed to explicitly state what does satisfy the statute.
The court merely stated that where the strip used to connect the city to the
targeted property is as narrow as three feet in width, then the burden of
production shifts to the municipality.   As is seen in Williams,  it can be173 174
difficult for a municipality to predict whether their piece of connecting
property satisfies the Seminole standard.  Seminole’s narrow holding leaves
future courts to determine the parameters of this new approach to annexations
as it applies in each situation.  Alternatively, the legislature can enact statutory
language that conclusively establishes the acceptable limits of strip
annexations in Oklahoma.
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